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Abstract
This paper analyzes the consequences of compulsory reductions in working time on employment.
The ￿rst part of the paper is devoted to the analysis of labor demand when the ￿rm chooses the
number of jobs and hours. This framework allows us to show that compulsory reductions in
standard hours can increase employment only if wage compensation is suﬃciently low. Then, the
second part of the paper looks at the determinants of wages, hours and employment in diﬀerent
frameworks: perfect competition, collective bargaining, monopsony. It is shown that regulation
of hours is justi￿ed and can even increase employment when competition is imperfect. However,
compulsory reductions in working hours cannot systematically improve employment and welfare.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Worksharing through reductions of working hours per week, per month or per year has often emerged
as a potential instrument for reducing unemployment. In some countries this instrument had not
only been potential during the last twenty years. In Germany, reductions in standard hours have
been negotiated between unions and employers in the eighties and the nineties to induce worksharing.
In France, large scale compulsory reductions in standard hours have been implemented in order to
increase employment. The basic theory that motivates worksharing policies relies on a simple rule of
three. For a constant level of production, reductions of working time increase the number of jobs. This
simple reasoning can make sense in a keynesian world in which the production of ￿r m si sd e t e r m i n e d
by aggregate demand. However, it is now well established that the keynesian conception of economics
neglects many determinants of employment, especially in the long run. In the long run, labor costs and
productivity are the main determinants of employment. Therefore, reductions in working time can
bene￿t to employment only if they entail changes in productivity and labor cost that favor employment.
Obviously, labor cost and productivity are themselves in￿uenced by a large number of institutional
features which interact with standard hours and which have to be taken into account to understand
the consequences of compulsory reductions in working hours.
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(Ed.) (2008) 20-45"From this point of view, economic analysis shows that compulsory reductions in standard hours
can increase employment, but in very special circumstances that are far from being often met in the
real world. In particular, it is generally not possible to increase employment thanks to reductions
in working hours accompanied by full wage compensation. In other words, drops in weekly working
hours have to go hand in hand with drops in weekly earnings to be able to favor employment. The
magnitude of the required drops in weekly earnings depends on the productivity changes induced by
working time reductions. If reductions in working time is accompanied by raises in the productivity
of each hour worked, it is possible to increase the number of jobs with small drops in weekly earnings.
However, if productivity of hours remains constant, large drops in weekly wages are required.
These results indicate clearly that the impact of compulsory reductions in working hours on em-
ployment hinges on the reaction of wages. Wages themselves are determined by preferences, technology
and markets mechanisms. The analysis of these mechanisms in diﬀerent contexts, including perfect
competition, collective bargaining and monopsony, allows us to shed light on the choices over working
hours and the consequences of reductions in working time when wages are endogenous. It appears
that working hours depend on features such as the preference for leisure and non market production,
the wage bargaining structure, the market power of ￿rms and the regulations of working conditions.
Moreover, when competition is imperfect, choices over working hours are not eﬃcient. Therefore,
regulations of working time are needed. Nevertheless, compulsory reductions in working hours cannot
systematically improve employment and welfare.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 is devoted to the analysis of labor demand when
the ￿rm chooses the number of jobs and hours. The interactions between choices of employers and
workers over hours, employment and wages are studied in section 3. Section 4 provides some concluding
comments.
2 Labor demand and working time
In order to grasp the determinants of the tradeoﬀ between jobs and hours, it is necessary to distinguish
the contributions of these two elements to the production process, and to diﬀerentiate between the
costs arising from an increase in the number of employees and those that arise from a change in the
number of hours worked by each employee. Assuming that the hourly wage remains constant, one can
then study the ￿pure￿ eﬀects of reductions in the working time. But reductions in working time with
constant hourly wages means drops in weekly and monthly wages. Workers are probably not ready
to accept such drops and will probably ask for higher hourly wages in order to try to keep unchanged










































82.1 The eﬀects of reductions in working time when the hourly wage is constant
The production process
Firms produce output with capital and labor services. Both labor and capital services are in￿uenced
by the duration of work. The working time of each worker determines the number of units of labor
services that he provides. A priori, an increase in working time raises the number of units of labor
services that each employee produces. However, it is important to stress that this relation might be
quite complex, for set up costs might imply that a minimum number of hours is required to get
positive returns form labor services, then, once this number is passed, the eﬃciency labor services
should increase rapidly with the number of hours. The eﬀects of fatigue as the hours pass should also
cause marginal eﬃciency to decrease for large values of working time.
Likewise, the duration of capital utilization may depend on the working time. One should expect
the duration of capital utilization to increase with the duration of work. However, it can be the case
that the duration of capital utilization is independent of the individual duration of work, or even
decreases with the duration of work if there are reorganizations of the production process associated
with changes in working time.
These brief remarks merely indicate that a ￿rm that keeps its number of employees constant lowers
its level of production when working hours and the duration of capital utilization shrink.
The cost of labor
The cost of labor does not depend in a simple way on its duration because workers and hours are
distinct outputs. This distinction is important for at least two reasons (Rosen, 1968, Hart, 1987).
In the ￿rst place, for each employed person there are ￿x e dc o s t st h a td on o td e p e n do nt h e
duration of work, principally the costs of hiring and ￿ring, training costs, and certain social security
contributions. These ￿xed costs are in￿uenced by the institutional environment: for instance, they are
higher in countries in which job protection is more stringent. They also depend on the unemployment
rate: when the unemployment rate is higher, hiring costs are lower because it takes less time to ￿nd
unemployed workers.
In the second place, in many countries there exists a legal or standard work duration, and every
overtime hour worked past that limit is remunerated at a higher rate than regular or standard hours.
For example, in the United States the ￿Fair Labor Standards Act￿, signed in 1938, de￿nes the standard
work week as 40 hours and lays down an overtime rate 50% higher for hours worked past that limit.
Let us use T to designate the standard work week, W to designate the wage for a normal hour, Z to
designate the ￿xed costs, and x to designate the overtime premium. Then the labor cost is written:
C =
½
[WT +( 1+x)W(H − T)+Z ]N if H>T










































8The choice of capital, hours and jobs
Let us designate by R the unit cost of capital utilization, then the total cost of production is
equal to C + RK. For each ￿rm, its optimal choice of capital, jobs and hours is deduced from the
minimization of this total cost, made of labor costs C plus capital costs RK. The expression (1) of the
labor costs C indicates that labor demand, here the number of persons employed and hours worked,
should depend on the comparison between the value of the variable labor costs ￿ determined by W,
T and x ￿ and that of the ￿xed costs of labor represented by Z. Intuition suggests that a reduction
in ￿xed labor costs gives ￿rms an incentive to substitute workers for hours, and thus ought to favor
employment. Conversely, a reduction in variable costs ought to increase the number of hours worked,
to the detriment of employment. The demand for workers and the demand for hours may thus vary
in inverse directions.
The inﬂuence of standard hours on hours and jobs
Changes in standard hours have contrasting eﬀects according to whether or not the ￿rm makes use
of overtime. Imagine that the level of standard hours is high relatively to what the ￿rm needs. Then
the optimal number of hours is lower than standard hours and obviously, changes in standard hours
have no eﬀect, neither on employment nor on hours actually worked. However, things are diﬀerent in
other cases.
If the optimal number of hours just corresponds to the standard hours the eﬀects of changes in
standard hours on the duration of work are trivial: reductions in standard hours evidently lead to
drops in the number of hours actually worked. But the consequence on the number of jobs is a priori
ambiguous. On one hand, the expression (1) of total labor cost shows that a reduction in standard
hours amounts to a reduction in the cost of each worker (equal to WT + Z), which tends to increase
employment, but on the other hand, it also means that the eﬃciency of labor is decreased, which may
give the ￿rm an incentive to lower its employment level.
Imagine now that the level of standard hours is low relatively to what the ￿rm needs. Then the
optimal number of hours is higher than standard hours and ￿rms will make use of overtime hours.
Looking at the de￿nition of the labor cost (1), it appears that decreases in standard hours increase
the marginal cost of each job (equal to C/N) but do not change the marginal cost of overtime hours
(equal to (1 + x)W). Therefore, the ratio between the cost of an additionnal worker and the cost of
an additionnal hour has increased which incites ￿rms to increase work duration at the expense of the
number of jobs when standard hours drop (see Rosen, 1968, and Calmfors and Hoel, 1988). In that
case, reductions in standard hours have the counter-intuitive eﬀect of raising the number of hours
worked by all employees. In other words, reductions in standard hours increase working hours by














































0.9 ￿ T 00 0 0
T 01 0 −0.96
1.04 ￿ T −2.23 −22 .00 1.86
Table 1: Values of elasticities of hours and employment. Source: Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, table
4.2, p. 203).
purpose of reductions in standard hours, which is precisely to bring down the actual number of hours
worked by every individual so as to increase the number of jobs.
According to these brief remarks, economic theory indicates that the employment eﬀects of reduc-
tions in standard hours are a priori ambiguous: when the hourly wage is taken as given, reductions
in standard hours should decrease employment in ￿rms in which actual working hours are larger than
standard hours and have the opposite eﬀect when actual hours are equal to standard hours.
Some quantitative results
In order to shed some light on the potential impact of reductions in standard hours on employment,
it is useful to consider a simple case in which the production function is a Cobb Douglas, assuming
that the share of the cost of labor in the total cost is equal to 0.7 and that the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor is equal to one. Empirical studies suggest that such values are relevant for
an ￿aggregate￿ production function that represents the technology of the economy as a whole. We
assume further that the elasticity of labor eﬃciency with respect to hours worked is equal to 0.9.1
We distinguish three types of ￿rm according to the relative level of their ￿xed costs compared
to their variable costs in order to have three diﬀerent behaviors for the choice of optimal hours. In
our calibration, ￿rms with small relative ￿xed cost has optimal hours equal to 90% of standard hours
(H∗ =0 .9￿T), ￿rms with medium relative ￿xed cost have optimal hours just equal to standard hours
(H∗ = T), and ￿rms with high relative ￿xed cost have optimal hours equal to 104% of standard hours
(H∗ =1 .04 ￿ T). Assuming that the overtime premium x is equal to 30%, table 1 gives the values
for the elasticities of optimal hours and employment, with respect to overtime premium (ηH
x and ηN
x )
and legal duration (ηH
T and ηN
T ).
Table 1 shows that variations in standard hours have very diﬀerent eﬀects on employment, since
elasticity ηN
T runs from −0.96 to 1.86 when the only source of heterogeneity in ￿r m si st h ee x t e n t
of the relative ￿xed costs of labor. The same remark applies to overtime premium. A reduction in
the number of hours worked allows employment to be signi￿cantly increased (at a given hourly wage)
when the actual number of hours is the same as the standard one, but has a very strong negative
eﬀects on employment in ￿rms that make use of overtime.
1Formally, the production function takes the form AK
0.3[H
0.9L]









































8Changes in: (percentage) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Employment +13 -17 -5
Production +6 -22 -16
Pro￿ts +12 -33 -8
Table 2: The eﬀects of a 10 percent decrease in standard hours. Case 1: No wage compensation, 5
percent decrease in weekly labor productivity and no decrease in the duration of capital utilization.
Case 2: Full wage compensation, 10 percent decrease in weekly productivity and 10 percent decrease
in the duration of capital utilization. Case 3: Full wage compensation, 6.66 percent decrease in weekly
labor productivity and no decrease in the duration of capital utilization.
2.2 Compensating for the global wage reduction
It is important to emphasize that what we have done is to look at the impact of variations in standard
hours and the overtime premium, while taking the hourly wage as given. Now there are good reasons
to think that the hourly wage is in￿uenced by these two variables, because reductions in time worked
entail reduction in monthly earnings when hourly wages remain constant. We can well imagine that
wage-earners would resist such income drops by demanding higher hourly wages. The German and
French past experiments show that it is indeed the case (see Hunt, 1999, and Cahuc, 2001). According
t oa n ys t a n d a r dm o d e lo fl a b o rd e m a n ds u c hr i s e si nt h ec o s to fl a b o rw o u l de n du pw i t hl o w e r
employment. But this is not the end of the story, because reductions in standard hours can also have
at least two bene￿cial eﬀects on employment that run counter increases in labor costs.
A ￿rst bene￿cial eﬀect that we have already mentioned is that average labor productivity is higher
when the duration of work is shorter (the eﬀects of fatigue as the hours pass should cause marginal
eﬃciency to decrease for larger values of hours). In other words, labor is more intensive when it
is spread on shorter durations and, as a general rule, rises in the average labor productivity will
favor employment. A second bene￿cial eﬀect concerns the reorganization of the production process.
Reductions in standard hours followed by reductions in the duration of capital utilization will have
an adverse impact of ￿rms pro￿tability and therefore on employment. Notwithstanding, reductions
in standard hours may induce signi￿cant reorganization in the production process leading to more
intensive capital utilization and thus to higher employment.
The ￿nal impact of a reduction in standard hours will depend upon the magnitude of all these
eﬀects. We use a model of labor demand similar to the preceding one to evaluate the impact of a 10%
reduction in standard hours under three diﬀerent alternatives2. Table 2 displays the results of these
three alternatives.
The most favorable case for employment is scenario 1. It assumes no compensation for the global
wage (the weekly wage decreases by 10 percent), the production process is reorganized in order to









































8Employers subsidies necessary to keep unchanged Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Employment -8 10 3
Pro￿ts -5 14 7
Table 3: Minimum level of employment subsidies (in percentage of initial labor cost) necessary to
maintain employment and pro￿ts when standard hours are decreased by 10 percent
keep the same duration of capital utilization and the average productivity of an hour of work increases
by 5 percent which implies that the productivity of labor over the week is decreased by 5 percent.
Under this scenario a 10 percent reduction in standard hours leads to a rise in employment by 13
percent (￿rms pro￿ts are increased by 6 percent and output gains 6 percent). Case 2 is the worst for
employment. It assumes a decrease in capital utilization, full wage compensation (the weekly wage
does not change) and no gain in hourly productivity. The main results are a 17 percent decrease in
employment with even greater drops in production and pro￿t s . C a s e s1a n d2r e p r e s e n tt w op o l a r
cases and any intermediary case ought to be considered as possible according to the values of the wage
compensation, the gain in hourly productivity and the change in capital utilization. Case 3 represents
such an intermediary situation where the wage compensation is complete, hourly labor productivity
increases by 3.33 percent3 and capital utilization remains unchanged. In that case, employment
decreases by 5 percent and total output and ￿rms pro￿ts also decrease signi￿cantly.
These results highlight the importance of wage compensation. Reductions in standard hours
with full wage compensation appear to be detrimental to employment even if the productivity gains
are huge4. Moreover, it turns out that reductions in working time can have strong negative eﬀects
on pro￿ts, especially for ￿rms in which there are low productivity gains and where there is strong
wage compensation. From this point of view, reductions of working time policies may accelerate the
destruction rate of some ￿rms.
These results suggest that policies that aim at reducing standard hours without too much damages
on the global wage and on pro￿ts should be linked with subsidies accruing to ￿rms. This is actually
the kind of strategy that has been implemented in France, where the reduction in working time to 35
hours has been accompanied by important employment subsidies in order to favor job creation. Table
3 displays the level of subsidies (expressed as a percentage of ex ante labor cost) that are necessary
to maintain employment and ￿rms pro￿ts under the three cases considered in Table 2.
Except in the unreasonable alternative described by case 1 where the global wage is reduced by
10 percent, Table 3 tells us that reductions in standard hours with full wage compensation must be
actually subsidized if one wishes simply to maintain the employment level and pro￿tability. Even in
3Estimates of the relation between hours and labor productivity yield very heterogenous results. Using French date
Gianella and Lagarde (1999) do not ￿nd any productivity gain following a reduction in working time. However, CrØpon
et al. (2004) ￿nd large productivity gains associated with the ￿Aubry￿ reductions in working time in 2000 in France.
It should be noticed that the ￿Aubry￿ reductions have been accompanied by important changes in the regulation of
working conditions, which allow the employer to use more ￿exible hours.









































8the favorable case 3 where labor productivity increases dramatically, ￿rms faced with a 10 percent
reduction in standard hours need subsidies that amount to 3 percent of total labor cost in order to
keep the level of employment unchanged (the subsidy must reach 7 percent of total labor cost to keep
the pro￿ts unchanged). Two signi￿cant lessons emerge from these results.
First, reductions in weekly working time cannot increase employment if weekly labor costs remain
constant. For workers paid at the minimum wage, this means that governements cannot increase
employment thanks to reductions in working that are not accompanied by drops in labor costs. Labor
costs can be reduced thanks to lower weekly earnings of employees. But such a scenario is generally
not wished. It is also possible to accompany reductions in working hours by job subsidies. However,
it turns out that job subsidies create more jobs when working hours are not reduced as long as the
weekly earnings of employees remain the same.
Second, as the employment eﬀects of compulsory reductions in working time are conditioned to a
large extent by the reaction of wages, it is essential to know more about the impact of reductions in
working hours on wages to be able to understand the employment eﬀects of working time reductions.
3 Working time, wages and employment
The competitive model of the labor market is a useful point of departure to begin to analyze the
consequences of reductions in working time on wages and employment. We are going to see that this
model delivers a very deceptive conclusion: it shows that compulsory reductions in standard hours
cannot improve welfare and are likely to destroy jobs. However, real economies are not perfectly
competitive. From this point of view, it is worth looking at models of imperfect competition to fully
understand the consequences of reductions in working time on employment when the reactions of
wages are taken into account. The conclusions obtained when imperfect competition is accounted for
help us to understand the usefulness of regulations of working hours. Moreover, they show that small
compulsory reductions in hours can, in certain circumstances, increase employment.
3.1 Perfect competition
In a perfectly competitive economy, compulsory reductions in standard hours cannot improve wel-
fare because they introduce constraints in a context in which the allocation of resources is eﬃcient.
Generally, the ineﬃciency of compulsory reductions in hours implies that such reductions are bad for
employment. However, interactions of labor supply decisions within households implies that aggregate
employment can increase when (ineﬃcient) compulsory reductions in working hours are introduced.
The choice of hours and wages
Economic analysis shows that perfect competition in the labor markets ought to lead to a wage













































Figure 1: Hours and wage in the economy with perfect competition
than others, and some suppliers of labor are more competent than others. Diﬀerences arising from
working conditions are explained by the hedonic theory of wages, the premises of which were sketeched
by Adam Smith at the end of the eighteenth century and have more recently been formalized by Rosen
(1974, 1986). From the perspective of the hedonic theory, wage heterogeneity re￿ects compensating
diﬀerentials: employees who work more hours per week should get higher earnings because they work
more. But the hedonic theory of wages yields more precise results: it shows that weekly earnings and
weekly working hours hinge on preferences and technology. Such results can be illustrated in a simple
framework where preferences are represented by a utility function v(Ω,H 0 − H), where Ω denotes
weekly earnings, H0 the time allocation and H the working hours per week. Between ￿rm competition
implies zero pro￿ts and wages equal to marginal productivity. This process leads to de￿ne the weekly
earnings as a function of weekly hours, denoted by Ω(H). The slope of this function depends on the
technology. It ought to be increasing when working hours are suﬃciently small, but may become
decreasing when hours are very long because fatigue may reduce labor productivity beyond a certain
threshold. The function that each worker faces may also be discontinuous, because his activities may
need to be coordinated with those of other workers. In this context, each worker chooses the working
hours that maximize his utility subject to the weekly earnings function Ω(H). The solution is displayed
on ￿gure 1. It turns out that workers choose working hours such that the marginal rate of substitution
between earnings and hours equals the marginal returns Ω0(H) of working hours.
This solution highlights that the choice of hours hinges on both preferences and technology. In
particular, individuals may choose lower working hours if they have stronger preferences for home
production. As stressed by Becker (1965), individuals may prefer to eat a meal prepared by themselves
r a t h e rt h a nw o r k i n gt ob ea b l et og ot or e s t a u r a n t . T h e r e f o r e ,w o r k i n gh o u r so u g h tt ob el o w e ri n









































8(2005) have shown that working hours are shorter in Europe than in the US, but individuals, and
especially women, devote more hours to home production in Europe than in the US. It is however not
clear whether this phenomenon arises from diﬀerences in preferences, rooted in diﬀerent cultures or in
diﬀerences in taxes (Blanchard, 2004, Algan and Cahuc, 2006, Pissarides et al. 2004, Rogerson, 2003).
The competitive model can also explain how technological changes can induce changes in working
hours (Greenwood et al.? 2005).
Reductions in working time
What are the consequences of compulsory reductions in working time when hours and wages are
determined by a competitive mechanism? Is it possible to foster job creation in European countries by
accelerating the decline in working hours observed in those countries as suggested by some observers?
Unfortunately, the perfect competitive model suggests, at ￿rst sight, that reductions in working
hours cannot increase employment. At best, such reductions have no eﬀect on employment because
the adjustement of the hourly wage rate can crowd out the impact of reductions in standard hours
on labor costs. More precisely, as suggested by Hamermesh and Trejo (2000), reductions in standard
hours can lead to decrease hourly wage rates because the number of hours worked that bene￿t from
overtime premium is increased when standard hours are decreased. Accordingly, when standard hours
drop, there are more overtime hours, but each hour of work is paid a lower wage such that both weekly
wages and hours of work remain unchanged.
However, reductions in the upper limit of hours worked can change employment because they
change the scope of contracts that can be bargained over. In order to grasp the employment eﬀects
of such changes, it is necessary to explain how employment is determined in our competitive model.
Employment is determined by the labor market participation decisions of individuals. More precisely,
an idle person whose non market income is equal to R reaches a utility level given by v(R,H0).T h u s ,
only the individuals for whom v(R,H0) <v (Ω,H 0 − H) accept jobs with earnings Ω and working
hours H. In this context, as shown by Figure 2, the scope of contracts being smaller when the upper
limit of hours worked is reduced, this leads to a decrease in the maximum utility derived from waged
work which diminishes labor market participation. It can be seen on Figure 2 that the equilibrium
goes from point A to B where the number of hours is lower and where the individuals achieve an
indiﬀerence curve that corresponds to a lower level of utility. Therefore, in this context, reductions in
working time cannot improve employment and eﬃciency.
Labor supply interactions within the family
For many individuals, labor supply decisions are in￿uenced by other people through family inter-
actions. From this point of view, economic analysis shows that constraints on the labor supply on
















































Figure 2: Reduction in working hours in the economy with perfect competition.
(Chiappori, 1992, Blundel and MaCurdy, 1999). This is the well known worker added eﬀect: if some-
one losses his jobs and becomes unemployed, the other members of his family who are inactive may
be induced to try to ￿nd a job. The eﬀects of contraints on worked hours can be similar: if reductions
in working hours lead to drops in the earnings of individuals who work less, other individuals may
be induced to enter in the labor market with an aim at maintaining the income of the household.
This process can increase employment. In particular, it may induce increases in female employment
because women may raise their labor supply when there are compulsory reductions in the working
time of their husband. Nevertheless, as such reductions in working time add restrictions on the set
of choices of all the members of the household, they cannot be welfare improving. Therefore, they
cannot be recommended even if they can lead to increases in female employment.
The contribution of Gersbach and Haller (2005) sheds a somewhat diﬀerent light on this issue. They
consider a context where household members diﬀer in individual preferences and enjoy positive leisure-
dependent externalities. The presence of ￿workaholic￿ member exerts negative externalities which can
be limited by compulsory reductions in working hours. Therefore, restrictions on the number of
hours an individual is allowed to work can bene￿t all workers and favor employment. Gersbach and
Haller show simply that the introduction of externalities allows us to depart from the conclusions of
the competitive case. In the same spirit, Alesina et al. (2005) argue that European labor market
regulations, advocated by unions in declining European industries who argued ￿work less, work all￿
explain the bulk of the diﬀerence between the U.S. and Europe. They also argue that these policies
may have had a more society-wide in￿uence on leisure patterns because of a social multiplier where the
returns to leisure increase as more people are taking longer vacations. In the presence of externalities,
a very hard question to answer is whether labor regulation introduce distortions that reduce welfare









































8(Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2005). On needs to know much more on these externalities to be able to
yield some relevant answers to this type of questions.
3.2 Collective bargaining
In the previous section we pointed out that the impact of reductions in the standard work week on
employment is conditioned by the response of wages. In this regard collective bargaining models
are particulary useful to study the impact of reduction of working time since collective bargaining
coverages are high in most European countries in which work sharing policies have been discussed
or implemented. For instance, according to OECD, collective bargaining coverage is above 90% in
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden, and above 80 in Italy and the Netherlands. Collective
bargaining models (see Booth and Ravaillon, 1993, and Contensou and Vranceanu, 2000) help us
understanding the in￿uence of the institutional context on the choice of working hours and on the
eﬃciency of reduction of working time. It appears that the results depend on a series of features such
as the preference for leisure of workers, the bargaining power of employees, the relative weight of
employment versus wages in trade union objectives, the degree of coordination of wage bargaining
and the regulation of working conditions. In order to show these results, we ￿rst describe the main
features of a simple collective bargaining model which includes bargaining on hours (formal details
are given in appendix).
A simple collective bargaining model
We consider a framework in which a trade-union bargains with a ￿rm over wages and hours. The
outcome of the bargaining process is represented by the generalized Nash bargaining solution where
the relative bargaining power of the union is denoted by γα∈ [0,1]. We assume further that a
legal constraint imposes an upper limit, denoted by ﬂ H, on the number of hours worked. In reality,
the standard duration should be distinguished from the upper limit for the hours worked above the
standard duration are remunerated at a higher rate. To simplify the exposition we will neglect the
distinction between the standard duration and the upper limit. We will also assume that the ￿rm
keeps the ￿right to manage￿ that signi￿es that employment is chosen by the ￿rm, once hours and
wages have been negotiated.
The union￿s objective is to maximize a function that depends on employment, denoted by L, and on
the net utility gains of employees. The net utility gains is de￿ned as the diﬀerence between the utility
o fa ne m p l o y e ea n da nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r .T h eu t i l i t yo fa ne m p l o y e ea m o u n t st ov(Ω,H 0−H), where
Ω,H 0 and H designate respectively income, the time allocation, and actual hours worked and the
utility of unemployed workers; v(•) is a utility function increasing with respect to both arguments. The
utility of an unemployed workers amounts to v(b,H0), where b stands for the income of unemployed









































8takes the form Ω￿(H0 − H)1−￿, where ￿ ∈ (0,1) measures the relative weight of income with respect
to leisure in workers preferences. A higher value of ￿ corresponds to stronger preferences for income
with respect for leisure. The relative weight of employment in trade-union￿s objective is denoted by
β ∈ (0,1). Accordingly, the objective of trade-union reads Lβ [v(Ω,H 0 − H) − v(b,H0)]
1−β
The production of the ￿rm depends on the number L of workers hired and the hours of work H.
The eﬃciency of the hours worked by each employee is assumed to be an increasing function with
constant elasticity denoted by ε, hence e(H)=Hε. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
revenue of the ￿rm is also described by an iso-elastic function taking the form R[e(H)L]=[ e(H)L]α/α,
with α ∈ (0,1). Therefore, the pro￿to ft h e￿rm reads R[e(H)L] − ΩL.
The outcome of the bargaining determines, together with the choice of employment by the ￿rm,
the wage, the working hours and the number of jobs.
The choice of hours
Let us ￿rst consider the case where the upper limit ﬂ H on working hours is not binding. It can
be shown that the negotiated number Hb of working hours is a fraction, denoted by ρ,o ft h et i m e
allocation H0, which depends on the bargaining power of the trade-union (γ), on the preference for
income versus leisure (￿), on the weight of employment in union￿s objective (β) and on technological
parameters such as the elasticity of the revenue function of the ￿rm (α) and the elasticity of the
eﬃciency of hours (ε). The signs of the variations of the negotiated number of working hours is










When the elasticity (ε)o ft h ee ﬃciency of labor services with respect to working hours is high,
working hours are also high because reductions in working hours imply large production drops. In
other words, it is more interesting to work longer hours when the marginal eﬃciency of hours is high.
If the workers attach more and more importance to income with respect to leisure, they will work
longer hours. Thus, Hb is an increasing function of the parameter ￿ like in the competitive model.
Bargaining power, market power and working hours
The model shows that increases in union￿s bargaining power (γ)l e a dt ol o w e rw o r k i n gh o u r s .
Indeed, a stronger union can bargain higher utility levels for is employees. Thus, as far as leisure is
a normal good, whose consumption increases with income, higher level of utilities are associated with
more leisure and less working hours.
It is interesting to notice that the negotiated level of the working hours is also in￿uenced by the









































8elasticity can re￿ect two features. First, the monopoly power of the ￿rm on its product market; this
elasticity being lower when the ￿rm has strong market power. Second, the degree of centralization of
negotiations. When negotiations are centralized, at the industry or the national level, the elasticity
of the revenue function is lower because the substitution eﬀects across the goods that are produced
by each ￿rm cancel out. Accordingly, strong monopoly power on the product market and highly
centralized wage bargaining should lead to low elasticity of the revenue function. It can be shown
that negotiated working hours increase with the elasticity of the revenue function. This implies that
economies with less competition on the product market and with higher degree of centralization of
wage bargaining should display lower working hours.
More jobs with longer working hours!
It turns out that stronger weights (β) on employment in union￿s objective is conducive to higher
hours. When the trade union puts more emphasis on employment, the solution of the negotiations
entails more employees, but with a lower level of utility for each employee. Accordingly, working hours
increase: each employee works more hours and gets lower weekly wage. This mechanism is exactly the
opposite of the so-called work sharing mechanims in which less working hours increase the number of
jobs. Here, when the union puts more emphasis on employment, the negotiation process gives rise to
more jobs, but at the expenses of the employees who are forced to accept utility losses, through lower
weekly wage and higher hours, to foster job creation.
It is worth noticing that this result is compatible with Hunt￿s (1999) conclusions of her meticulous
empirical study of reductions in working time in Germany in the eighties and the nineties. Hunt
concludes her paper by the following statement: ￿Germany￿s work-sharinng experiment has thus
allowed those who remained employed to enjoy lower hours at a higher hourly wage, but likely at
the price of lower overall employment￿. Interpreting this conclusion under the light of our collective
bargaining model, it can be argued that it was actually a lower weight of employment in unions￿
objective that led to German￿s reductions in working time and to employment drops in the eighties
and the nineties.
All these results assume that the negotiated working hours Hb given by equation (2) are not higher
than the authorized upper limit ﬂ H. Conversely, if Hb > ﬂ H, working time per individual will be equal
to ﬂ H. Let us examine this case now.
The consequences of reductions in standard hours
The case where Hb > ﬂ H is interesting for it may help to understand whether it is possible to force
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Figure 3: Employment in the collective bargaining model
W i t has i m p l em o d e lo fl a b o rd e m a n d ,w eh a v es h o w ni nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o nt h a tt h ei m p a c to f
reductions in standard hours on employment hinges on the reaction of wages. In our simple model of
wage bargaining, the elasticity of the weekly wage with respect to hours worked (which are equal to
ﬂ H) depends on the number of hours worked5. This elasticity is positive, hence reductions in standard
hours decrease weekly wages. Moreover, this elasticity increases with ﬂ H, which means that reductions
in the weekly wage entailed by standard hours drops are larger if the number of hours worked is high.
This suggests that it is easier to increase employment throught mandatory reductions in working time
when working time is high rather than low. It also turns out that the elasticity of the weekly wage
with respect to working hours is larger when the preference for leisure is stronger. Therefore, it should
be easier to increase employment throught reduction in working time when individuals have stronger
preferences for leisure.
The knowledge of the wage elasticity with respect to hours allows us to determine the impact
of reductions in hours on employment taking into account the wage response. The relation between
employment and standard hours (equivalent in this framework to the upper limit ﬂ H)i sd i s p l a y e db y
t h eb o l dc u r v eo n￿gure 3.
If the upper limit on hours ﬂ H is above the negotiated level Hb, the constraint on the upper limit
for hours is not binding and the individual duration of work reaches the value Hb and the employment
level is equal to Lb. If ﬂ H is smaller than Hb, the constraint on the upper limit for hours is binding,
the individual duration of work equals ﬂ H and the level of employment is given by the bold curve in









































8￿gure 3 located at the left of point (Hb,L b). One sees that employment reaches its maximum for a
duration of work denoted by Hmax.
Figure 3 indicates that reductions in hours worked are favorable to employment if and only if the
number of hours worked is above the threshold value Hmax. Below this value, the elasticity of the
weekly wage with respect to hours becomes too small to allow reductions in working hours to create
jobs. In other words, below this value, the hourly wage increases too much when working time is
decreased so that working time reductions become bad for employment.
I ti ss h o w ni nt h ea p p e n d i xt h a tHmax is equal to the number of hours negotiated Hb when the
union disposes of all the bargaining power (γ =1 ) . Hence, its properties are described by equation
(2) where γ =1 . Therefore, Hmax decreases with the preference for leisure, the market power of the
￿rm and the degree of centralization of wage bargaining. These results mean that it is possible to
increase employment throught mandatory working time reductions for lower values of working hours
in economies in which workers display a strong preference for leisure, where unions￿ bargaining power
is strong, where collective bargaining is highly centralized and ￿rms have strong market power.
Reductions in working time and working conditions
The impact of reductions in working time on employment is also in￿uenced by interactions between
working conditions and working time. This in￿uence appears when one notices that the threshold value
Hmax increases with the elasticity ε of labor services with respect to hours. At this point, it should
be noticed that the elasticity of labor services with respect to hours is in￿uenced by the possibility to
reorganize production when working time is decreased. This elasticity ought to be smaller for manda-
tory reductions in working time when ￿rms have more possibilities to reorganize production. The
reorganization of production could be considered as endogenous as in the contributions of Askenazy
(2004) and d￿Autume (2001) who provide bargaining models that analyze the connections between
working time, hours ￿exibility, and labor eﬀort. These models show that in return for higher hourly
wages, trade unions consent to greater management-controlled hours ￿exibility. Hours ￿exibility, in
turn, leads to a deterioration in working conditions, including an intensi￿cation of labor eﬀort. In this
type of model, shorter working time may increase work eﬀort and deteriorate working conditions.
From this point of view, stringent regulations of working conditions, which hinder the reorgani-
zation of work, lead to high elasticities of labor services with respect to working hours in case of
compulsory reductions in working time. Therefore, compulsory reductions in working time are less
likely to create jobs when there are stringent regulations on working conditions.
In sum, models of bargaining over the number of hours to be worked show that union power should
exert downward pressure on these hours. It also turns out that forcible reductions in the number of
hours worked have a more favorable impact on employment when union bargaining power is slight.









































8bargaining power. Moreover, in this context, compulsory reductions in working time increase the
utility of the trade-union, because the utility of employees remains unchanged when working time
is reduced whereas the number of jobs increase. Obviously, this process makes sense only for small
enough reductions in working hours such that the number of hours worked remains above a certain
limit that depends on the preferences of individuals and on the technology. From this point of view,
monopsony models of the labor market deliver the same type of result.
3.3 Monopsony power
Marimon and Zilibotti (2000), Contensou and Vranceanu (2002) and Rocheteau (2002) have shown,
in matching models ￿ la Pissarides (2000), that starting from a laissez-faire economy in which ￿rms
have some monoposony power, small reductions in working time result in increases in the equilibrium
employment while large reductions reduce employment. Moreover, it appears that small reductions in
working hours can improve the welfare of employees. Manning (2001) gets the same type of results in
pure monopsony models where it is shown that compulsory restrictions on hours or working condition
can improve workers￿ welfare.
As i m p l ef r a m e w o r k
This type of result can be illustrated in a simple framework in which the preferences of the
individuals over income and hours are still represented by the utility function v(WH,H 0 − H)=
(WH)
￿ (H0 − H)1−￿ where W and H respectively represent the hourly wage and the numbers of
hours worked. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that each hour of work produces a con-
stant quantity of good denoted by y, so that pro￿ts per employee read (y − W)H. Moreover, it is
assumed that individuals are heterogenous with respect to the level of utility that they get when
they do not work. More precisely, we assume that the non market incomes of the idle persons are
described by a cumulative distribution function denoted by G(•). An idle person whose non market
income is equal to R reaches a utility level given by R￿H0
1−￿. Thus, only the individuals for whom
R￿H0
1−￿ < (WH)
￿ (H0 − H)1−￿ accept jobs with a wage W and working hours H. If working age
population is normalized to one, labor supply is simply G(WH[(H0 − H)/H0]
1−µ
µ ).
The equilibrium with perfect competition is characterized by a zero pro￿t condition for ￿rms. The
competitive equilibrium hourly wage is thus equal to the productivity of an hour of labor, i.e. WC = y.
Given this wage, individuals work a number of hours, denoted by HC, that maximizes their utility,
and employment attains the level LC given by G(yHC [(H0 − HC)/H0]
1−µ
µ ).
T h ec h o i c eo fw a g ea n dh o u r s
Let us now consider the case of monopsony. By de￿nition, a ￿rm in such a position oﬀers contracts
over wage W and hours H knowing that the labor supply is then G(WH[(H0 − H)/H0]
1−µ
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Figure 4: Hours and wages in the monopsony model. WC and HC stand for the hourly wage and the
working hours in the competitive equilibrium. Subscript M designates the monopsony solution.
is no legal upper limit on hours worked, it is shown in the appendix that a monopsony that seeks
to maximize its pro￿ts subject to the labor supply constraint will choose a wage WM smaller than
the competitive wage WC and a work duration HM larger than the competitive work duration. The
results are displayed on ￿gure 4 which shows that the monopsony chooses a contract with a lower
hourly wage and higher hours than in the competitive situation. Therefore, workers get lower utility
than in the competitive equilibrium, which implies that employment is lower than in the competitive
equilibrium.
Compulsory reductions in working hours
Let us now assume that there is an upper limit ﬂ H on hours worked. The results are displayed on
￿gure 5 (see the model in the appendix for the calculations). This ￿gure represents employment as a
function of the upper limit on hours ﬂ H.I fﬂ H is larger than HM, the monopsony is not constrained on
its decisions, the individual duration of work reaches the value HM and the employment level is equal
to LM. If ﬂ H is smaller than HM, the monopsony is constrained to set working hours to ﬂ H and the level
of employment is given by the bold curve in ￿gure 5. One sees that compulsory reductions in working
time increase employment as long as working time is above the competitive level HC. Conversely,
reductions in working time ﬂ H decrease employment when ﬂ H is below the competitive level.
These results are strikingly reminiscent of the eﬀects of the minimum wage as analyzed by Stigler
(1946) who showed that the relationship between employment and the minimum wage is not monotonic
but increasing for low values of the minimum wage and decreasing for higher ones when the labor
market is monopsonistic.
Figure 5 also shows that the maximum employment attainable by a monopsony happens for ﬂ H =
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Figure 5: Employment in a monopsony model with a constraint on hours worked.
Nothwithstanding, in this latter case employment is less than the competitive level of employment
because the ￿rms sets a wage smaller than in the competitive case. Hence, regulations of working
hours can improve employment and welfare but cannot alone reach the ￿rst best situation. For this,
it is necessary to have a second instrument in form of a minimum wage. Imposing a minimum wage
higher than the monopsony wage and reducing the working time improves the welfare of workers (see
the appendix for details).
In sum, monopsony and bargaining models show that regulation of working hours can improve
employment and welfare of workers. However, these models also show that compulsory reductions
in hours are not likely to improve systematically employment and welfare. Indeed, heterogeneity in
preferences and in individual productivities implies heterogeneous choices in worked hours that cannot
be eﬃciently regulated by a single constraint on working time which does not account for the diversity
of people.
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A Labor demand elasticities
The working time of each worker determines the number of units of labor services that he provides. This number
can be represented by an increasing function of working time, H, denoted e(H). If N designates the number of
persons employed in the ￿rm, then labor services are expressed by the product Ne(H), assuming, for the sake
of simplicity, that all employees work the same amount of hours.
Denoting by d(H) the duration of capital utilizatin, capital services are expressed by the product Kd(H)
where K designates the stock of capital. One should expect the function d(H) to increase with the duration
of work. Finally the output Y produced by a ￿rm is a function of K, N and H that can be written as
Y = F[Kd(H),Ne(H)].
Let us consider a ￿rm whose pro￿ts read
Π = F[Kd(H),Ne(H)] − ΩN
where F is a production function with constant returns to scale. Let us denote by σ the elasticity of substitution





























Noticing that the homogeneity of degree one of the production function implies that F1Kd+ eNF2 = F,


























Now, let us consider that the capital stock is given. The ￿rst-order condition with respect to employment reads
e(H)F2(d(H)K,e(H)N)=Ω



































































8Using equation (A1) and the de￿nition of the share of capital costs at the optimum, which reads α =















H stands for the elasticity of the weekly wage with respect to hours. Equation (A2) shows that reductions
in working time decrease employment when there is full wage compensation (ηΩ
H =0 )i fηd
H ≥ 0,ηe
H ≥ 0 and the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor services σ is larger than the share of capital in total costs
α. These conditions, which are very weak, are generally satis￿ed.
The results given in tables 2 and 3 assume that α =0 .3 and σ =0 .5.
B The collective bargaining model
B.1 The Nash criterion
The union￿s objective reads:
Vs = ‘β [v(Ω,H 0 − H) − v(w,H0)]
1−β ,‘ = Min(1,L/ N)
In this expression, N designates the (exogeneous) size of the union. When employment is equal to L and




[e(H)L]α − ΩL (B3)
We assume that the ￿rm retains the right-to-manage. Here, this hypothesis signi￿es that the employer
decides on the size of his or her workforce after bargaining over the hourly wage w and the number H of
hours to be worked has been completed. In these conditions, labor demand, denoted by L(Ω,H), is found by


















Assuming that if there is failure to reach agreement the ￿rm obtains zero pro￿t, the issues of bargaining







[v(Ω,H 0 − H) − v(w,H0)]
γ(1−β)[Π(Ω,H)]1−γ
subject to:









































8B.2 The optimal number of hours worked
Interior solutions
For an interior solution, the derivatives of the logarithm of the Nash criterion with respect to Ω and H yield
the ￿rst-order conditions. They are written:
(1 − β)γv1(Ω,H 0 − H)





(1 − β)γv2(Ω,H 0 − H)





Dividing these last two relations member to member, we get:
v1(Ω,H 0 − H)







This last equation de￿nes the marginal rate of substitution between income and leisure as a function of
the hourly wage W = Ω/H and the elasticity ε of individual productivity with respect to hours. The general
study of the system formed by equations (B5) and (B6) is possible, but we will arrive at the main results
more rapidly by assuming that the utility of each member of the union is a function of the Cobb-Douglas type
v(Ω,H 0 − H)=Ω￿(H0 − H)1−￿, with ￿ ∈]0,1[. In particular, equation (B7) then immediately gives us the
number of hours worked:
Hb =
ε￿α[1− γ(1 − β)]
(1 − ￿)[γβ + α(1 − γ)] + ε￿α[1 − γ(1 − β)]
H0 (B8)
The parameter ￿ is interpreted as a measure of the importance of income with respect to leisure for each
worker. Equation (B8) shows that the optimal number of hours worked is an increasing function of this
parameter, and of elasticity ε. In consequence, constraint Hb ≤ ﬂ H is less likely to be binding if this elasticity is
weaker, or if workers attach less importance to income than they do to leisure.
Constrained solutions
Let us now assume that there is a compulsory number of hours, ﬂ H, lower than the number arrived at
through bargaining, de￿ned by equation (B8). The negotiated wage is then given by equation (B5) with
H = ﬂ H. Assuming, as above, that preferences are of the Cobb-Douglas type, this equation implicitly de￿nes
the negotiated wage as follows:
Ω￿(H0 − ﬂ H)1−￿ =
α(1 − γ)+γβ
α(1 − γ)+γβ − γ￿(1 − β)(1 − α)
v(w,H0) (B9)









































8Since the right-hand side of this equation does not depend on hours, we deduce from it the elasticity ηΩ
H of
the weekly wage with respect to hours ﬂ H. We thus arrive at ηΩ
H = ﬂ H(1 − ￿)/￿(H0 − ﬂ H).
When H = ﬂ H, equation (B4) de￿ning labor demand gives the employment level which is thus equal to
L(Ω, ﬂ H). As the negotiated global wage Ω depends also on ﬂ H ￿ see equation (B9) ￿, the employment level
L(Ω, ﬂ H) can be considered as a function of ﬂ H. Deriving this function with respect to ﬂ H, one sees that the





Comparison of equations (B8) and (B10) indicates that Hmax is equal to the number of hours negotiated Hb
when the union disposes of all the bargaining power (γ =1 ) . Since the negotiated number of hours Hb decreases
with the bargaining power γ of the workers, one always has Hb >H max for 0 < γ < 1. Finally, noticing that
Hmax does not depend on ﬂ H, one obtains Figure 3 that represents the employment level as a function of ﬂ H.
C The monopsony model with hours
The equilibrium with perfect competition is characterized by a zero pro￿t condition for ￿rms. The competitive
equilibrium hourly wage is thus equal to the productivity of an hour of work, i.e. WC = y. Given this wage,
the utility level of a worker is given by (yH)
￿ (H0 − H)1−￿. Maximizing this last expression with respect to H
yields the competitive individual labor supply denoted by HC. One gets HC = ￿H0. Employment corresponds
to aggregate labor supply that reads G(yHC [(H0 − HC)/H0]
1−￿
￿ ). For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed in the
sequel that G is uniform over the interval [0,R u],R u >y ,thus G(R)=( R/Ru) and the competitive equilibrium
is ￿nally described by:




















When G(R)=( R/Ru), neglecting exogenous parameters the monopsonist problem reads
max
(W,H)




H ≤ ﬂ H (C12)
















































































that reaches its maximum at ﬂ H = HC.
When ﬂ H varies from 0 to H0, the solutions of the monopsony are represented by the bold curve in ￿gure 4.
It is worth noticing that the highest employment level attainable by the monopsony is obtained when it is
constrained to accept the competitive level of hours, i.e. when ﬂ H = HC. In that case, (C11) and (C13) show
that the monopsony sets employment to the level LC/2 which is of course smaller than the competitive level LC.
These results prove that regulating a monopsony by means of the duration of work can improve employment
(see the comments in the main text) but cannot reach the ￿rst best optimum. For this it is also necessary to
impose a minimum wage greater than the wage set by the monopsony. In this simple model, the minimum wage
should be set equal to y (the level of the competitive wage) which is greater than the monospsony wage equal
to y/2.
27
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
2
5
5
7
7
0
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
1
4
 
F
e
b
 
2
0
0
8